On January 2, 1863, the Confederate Army and Union Army clashed in central Tennessee at a small crossing known as the “Battle of Stones River”. This battle would be one of the most important battles fought throughout the American Civil War.
We will discuss why this pivotal moment was so important for both sides and how it changed the course of history.
Prelude to the Battle of Stones River
Following the Battle of Perryville in Kentucky on October 8, 1862, Confederate general Braxton Bragg’s Army of Mississippi regrouped in Harrodsburg and was joined by Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith’s army contained 10,000 soldiers two days later. With a unified force of up to 38,000 seasoned troops, Bragg took no steps to regain control over the situation while Union commander Maj. Gen Don Carlos Buell declined any efforts made for an attack against them. These will be the main participants of the Battle of Stones River.
With his prospects in Kentucky diminishing and supplies dwindling, Bragg made the decision to abandon Kentucky and march through Cumberland Gap. He continued on to Knoxville and Chattanooga before heading northwest toward Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Upon arrival, he joined forces with Smith’s Army of Kentucky, which was then renamed the Army of Tennessee on November 20th. The newly formed force took up a defensive position near Stones River Northwest from Murfreesboro. On December 16th, Confederate president Jefferson Davis arrived to Bragg’s army and mandated that the infantry division led by Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson be sent to Mississippi to aid with Vicksburg’s defense – a decision which would result in Bragg losing 7,500 of his men before battle commencement. Consequently, after reorganizing what was left of the brigade, Kirby Smith departed for East Tennessee, leaving behind a weakened military force.
Bragg assumed charge over two corps, which were led by Major Generals William J. Hardee, John C. Breckinridge, Patrick R. Cleburne, and John P. McCown, as well as Leonidas Polk’s divisions that included Major Generals Benjamin F Cheatham and Jones M Withers – with Brigadier General Joseph Wheeler overseeing their operations in totality. Despite a host of prominent generals repeatedly petitioning President Davis to replace General Braxton Bragg with Joseph E. Johnston, the Commander-in-Chief of all militaries in the Western Theater, Jefferson held firm and declined their requests – leaving both commanders in place.
President Abraham Lincoln was becoming increasingly frustrated with the inactivity of Major General Buell, so he replaced him with William S. Rosecrans – a victor from Iuka and Corinth battles. As such, Rosecrans led his XIV Corps (later known as Army of the Cumberland) to Nashville, Tennessee, where they received an ultimatum from Washington: move forward aggressively against Bragg or be replaced themselves. Rosecrans took advantage of the time he had to ready and equip his troops, particularly his cavalry, as well as replenish their supplies. It was not until December 26 that he started following Bragg’s route.
Initial Troop Movements Before the Battle of Stones River
As Rosecrans readied his army in Nashville, Bragg commanded Col. John Hunt Morgan to head north with his cavalry and cut off Rosecran’s supply line so he could not find provisions north of the city. The Battle of Hartsville at a ford on the Cumberland River 40 miles upstream from Nashville—north of Murfreesboro—marked one episode during Morgan’s daring raid before most of Rosecrans’s infantry had mobilized for the battle of Stones River.
The Union’s defeat in the relatively brief skirmish following Morgan’s unexpected attack was humiliating, leading to a vast number of captives and captured supplies. In addition, they undertook an operation involving their cavalry forces on December 26th -the day Rosecrans left Nashville- under Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan.
Samuel P. Carter and his troop conducted a raid in the upper Tennessee Valley, beginning from Manchester, Kentucky. Throughout their attack, until January 5th was completed, they demolished several railroad bridges as well as engaged in multiple skirmishes – one of them being particularly intense at Perkins’s Mill (also known as Elk Fort). However, neither the Confederate nor Union cavalry raids had any real effect on the Stones River Campaign outcome.
On the day after Christmas, Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland headed southeast in three divisions towards Murfreesboro. But Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry hindered their progress by causing disruption and delayed them from reaching their destination on time. At that point, Rosecrans reported 81,729 troops in Nashville; however, he had to keep some behind with his supplies and base in order to prevent further interference from Wheeler’s men – reducing forces down to just half or less than before.
On the left wing, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden led 14,500 men in divisions of Brigadier Generals Wood, Palmer, and Van Cleve on a course parallel to the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad through La Vergne and south of Smyrna. Meanwhile, 16,000 troops under command of Maj. Gen Alexander M McCook, with brigades from Davis Johnson and Sheridan, marched along Nolensville Turnpike towards Nolensville before trekking further eastward to Murfreesboro by way of Triune.
Approximating 13,500 troops led by Maj. Gen. George Henry Thomas, which included divisions of
Maj. Gen. Lovell H Rousseau and Brig Gens James S Negley, Speed S Fry, and Robert B Mitchell traveled southward along the Wilson Turnpike, and Franklin Turnpike parallel to the Nashville-Decatur railroad traces before heading east through Nolensville while following a similar path taken by Crittenden South of the Nashville Chattanooga Rail Road Union Cavalry under command of Brigadier General ____ also accompanied them on their journey towards enemy lines.
Before the U.S.’s three columns commenced their journey, a single cavalry division under Col. John Kennett led the way, with David S. Stanley at its head. The purpose of splitting up into wings was to conduct a strategic turning movement against Hardee in Triune, yet when the march began, Bragg quickly relocated Hardee to Murfreesboro so that an encounter could be avoided and he would not have to engage in battle unpreparedly.
Location of the Battle of Stones River
The one-time state capital of Murfreesboro, named after the esteemed Revolutionary War colonel Hardy Murfree, was located in a lush agricultural area and situated within Stones River Valley. Bragg and his men were overwhelmed by the warm hospitality they entailed upon arrival in December of that same year. With Union troops looming ever closer to Chattanooga, it became clear that this small town would be key in blocking their advance as well as provisioning for an army; however, Hardee noted afterward that there “were no particular advantages” when assessing its potential strategic value on the battlefield.
Bragg was hesitant to go further south, such as the Duck River Valley, or north to Stewart’s Creek, which Rosecrans suggested for a better defense. Considering he had been instructed not to surrender any Tennessee ground under Federal control, Bragg chose a more level area northwest of Nashville and situated along the Stones River. The intersection of Nashville Pike and the Nashville-Chattanooga Railroad was especially dense with small cedar forests. It is said that these woodlands were so impenetrable to infantry that they rivaled even the vast Wilderness of Spotsylvania in Virginia.
Hardee’s Corps was initially stationed in Triune, about twenty miles west of the river, where limestone outcroppings created a kind of barrier for wagons and artillery. Meanwhile, Polk’s troops assembled on the west bank while John C. Breckinridge commanded an independent division from Hardee’s Corps to hold down low hills located east of the river; however, no directives were issued regarding fortification construction.
The Day of the Battle of Stones River
On the final day of the year, at first light around 6:00 a.m., Confederate William J. Hardee set off in an unexpected and powerful attack on Union right flank under Maj. Gen. John P. McCown – catching Brig. Gen Richard W Johnson’s division was unawares as many had yet to finish their breakfast! This was not the first time that such an early morning ambush caught Union forces unaware, following the precedent from Fort Donelson and Shiloh battles priorly. In one colossal wave, 10,000 Confederates amassed on their left side, engaging with full force.
McCook’s illusory campfires and his division’s lack of experience left a huge gap in the front line. Fortunately, Maj. Gen Patrick R. Cleburne’s division surged forth from McCown’s rear to fill that void and pushed away all opposition. Several artillery batteries were taken without firing even one shot! Johnson’s adjacent Union division, led by Brig General Jefferson C Davis, scarcely managed to hold their own for a brief period before succumbing too, suffering over 50% casualties as a result of it!
Despite facing intense opposition, Hardee managed to push the Union troops three miles back to a railroad and the Nashville Pike by 10 AM. Johnson was able to rally his forces in that location. Rosecrans had initially launched Horatio P Van Cleve’s division crossing the river at 7 AM but canceled it, realizing McCook would not be able to fend off Hardee’s attack; he instead immediately shifted reinforcements towards his own right flank as he had been slow in recognizing the danger of this assault.
As Rosecrans galloped swiftly across the battlefield, guiding his battalions as if everywhere at once, his uniform was spattered with blood from Col. Julius Garesché’s demise; he had been beheaded by a cannonball while riding beside him.
At the crack of dawn, Polk’s corps made its second Confederate advance. Comprised of Generals Jones M. Withers’ and Benjamin F. Cheatham’s divisions, their objective was complete Union destruction -but Brigadier General Philip Sheridan foiled this plan with his foresight; he not only predicted an attack but had all troops in position by 4 a.m., just as Withers struck McCook’s wing on Davis’ left flank! In three separate engagements, however, Sheridan successfully repelled them both, saving the Union from total decimation that morning rate charges.
Cheatham’s reserve division then charged forward to attack Sheridan’s front while the troops of Cleburne collided with his flank. The assault was sluggish and disjointed, leading witnesses to speculate that Cheatham had been indulging in excessive amounts of alcohol and subsequently failed to direct his forces effectively.
Sheridan’s forces were successful in slowing the enemy’s progress, though it came at a great cost to them; all three of Sheridan’s brigade commanders perished that day, and over one-third of his troops were lost within four hours in what would later be referred to as “The Slaughter Pen”. By 10:00 a.m., the Confederates had already attained their goals by taking 28 canons and approximately 3,000 Union soldiers captive.
Two Confederate blunders aided Rosecrans. Breckinridge, on the east side of the river, did not realize that Crittenden’s early morning attack had been withdrawn. He refused to send two brigades as reinforcements across the river to aid the main attack on the left. When Bragg ordered him to attack to his front—so that some use could be made of his corps—Breckinridge moved forward and was embarrassed to find out that there were no Union troops opposing him.
At about that time, Bragg received a false report that a strong Union force was moving south along the Lebanon Turnpike in his direction. He canceled his orders that Breckinridge sends reinforcements across the river, diluting the main attack’s effectiveness.
By 11:00 a.m., Sheridan’s ammunition ran low, and his division pulled back, which opened a gap that Hardee exploited. The Union troops regrouped and held the Nashville Pike, supported by reinforcements and massed artillery.
In the 4-acre wooded terrain known as “Round Forest” by locals, or more famously referred to as ‘Hell’s half an Acre’, Col. William B. Hazen and his brigade stood their ground against repeated assaults on the left flank of the Union line. To bolster defenses even further, Brigadier General Milo S. Hascall sent in reinforcements from the 3rd Kentucky Regiment when informed that its commander had passed away – at which point he assumed personal command of this important strategic position himself! He declared that the line must be maintained, no matter the cost. Ultimately, it was Hazen’s brigade who successfully defended what remained of the Union line. The brilliant leadership of Rosecrans and Johnson & Davis’ rallying call allowed them to re-establish a new position in a small half-oval shape near their original line with its back facing towards the river.
Bragg had the idea to launch an attack against the Union left, which was guarded by Hazen’s brigade and faced southeast. Breckinridge’s troops have delegated this feat; however, they moved at a snail’s pace. Finally, at 4:00 p.m., their first two brigades attempted a piecemeal offensive on Hazen but ultimately failed after receiving heavy fire from the opposition forces.
As two additional brigades were dispatched to the battle, they were quickly bolstered by other divisions of Polk’s army. However, their offensive was unsuccessful, and Thomas then responded with a restricted counterattack that restored his position. By late afternoon, all hostilities ceased as the battle came to an end.
Despite his intention of severing the Nashville Pike, Bragg’s scheme had one key drawback: it encouraged Union troops to congregate at that very site. Grady McWhiney, a biographer of Bragg, noted this fact when he stated:
Unless the Union army collapsed at the first onslaught, it would be pushed back into a tighter and stronger defensive position as the battle continued, while the Confederate forces would gradually lose momentum, become disorganized, and grow weaker. Like a snowball, the Union would pick up strength from the debris of battle if they retreated in good order. But the Confederates would inevitably unwind like a ball of string as they advanced.
That evening, Rosecrans held a council of war to decide their next move. While some generals suggested retreating so as not to be completely cut off, Thomas and Crittenden staunchly opposed such an idea. History records various accounts of what was said at the meeting but all sources confirm that Thomas declared either “This army does not retreat” or “There’s no better place to die”. With newfound morale due to reinforced lines, the Union decided it would indeed stand its ground and fight come morning.
Bragg was certain of acquiring victory, despite having suffered 9,000 casualties. His conviction that numerous Union troops had been captured suggested to him that Rosecrans had experienced much greater losses in the battle. As such, Confederate forces took a defensive position against their opponents, and Bragg sent reports of his accomplishment back to Richmond before retiring for the night. “The enemy has yielded his strong position and is falling back. We occupy [the] whole field and shall follow him. … God has granted us a happy New Year.”
At the break of dawn on New Year’s Day, 1863, Rosecrans activated his original plan and commanded Col. Samuel Beatty (who replaced Van Cleve due to a previous injury) to cross the river and occupy any elevated ground in sight; this would protect two bank crossings as well as set up an ideal artillery platform. Despite Polk’s attempted probes against Thomas’ and Sheridan’s troops during that relatively peaceful day, there was limited adverse effect observed by either side – most likely because both armies were tending to their wounded or taking a much needed rest from battle.
Wheeler’s cavalry at the back of the battlefield detained Union communication on the turnpike returning to Nashville. To protect wounded travelers, heavy escorts were required for each convoy, which Wheeler interpreted as a sign that Rosecrans was planning his retreat; this information was reported directly to Bragg, who believed he had already won and chose instead to wait patiently for Rosecrans’ withdrawal.
Upon Bragg’s orders, at 4:00 p.m. on January 2nd, Breckinridge led his army in a daring attack against Beatty’s division that was occupying the hill to the east of the river. Henry initially argued that such an offensive would result in disastrous consequences but eventually consented and aggressively charged forward with vigor. The Union troops were pushed back across McFadden Ford due to immense pressure from Confederate forces, yet received intense fire as retaliation from Captain John Mendenhall’s booming artillery unit located beyond the other side of the river under Crittenden’s commandment.
Mendenhall’s strategic positioning of his artillery was indispensable for protecting Rosecrans’ forces. He placed 45 guns in a hub-to-hub formation on the ridge overlooking McFadden’s Ford, and 12 more at a mile southwest to provide devastating enfilading fire from both banks—an arrangement that left the enemy without an escape or any hope of victory.
The Confederate offense ceased as they sustained more than 1,800 casualties in a meager hour. James S. Negley, leading the Union division under Thomas’s wing, issued a counterattack at 4:45 p.m., which caused the Confederate soldiers to retreat in disarray. Breckinridge’s Kentucky troops (otherwise known as Hanson’s Brigade or Orphan Brigade due to its isolation from occupied Kentucky) were gravely affected, with one-third of them lost on that day, and he was inconsolable, crying out repeatedly, “My poor Orphans! My poor Orphans!”
On January 3, Brig. Gen. James G. Spears arrived at Rosecrans with a plentiful supply train and reinforced infantry brigade, though Wheeler’s cavalry attempted to hijack the ammunition wagons that followed it but was ultimately unsuccessful in their endeavor. Later on in the evening, Lovell H. Rousseau led Thomas’ division into an attack against the Confederate center due to constant sharpshooting from enemy troops, which resulted in taking no less than 30 prisoners before retreating back from whence they came earlier that day – thus effectively ending what is considered as one of history’s greatest battles on January 2nd.
Realizing that Rosecrans had no intention of retreating and would soon be bolstered with an army 70,000 strong – only 20,000 Confederates available for the battle – Bragg knew he was in a precarious position. The weather was worsening, and if the river rose anymore due to the freezing rain it could split his troops apart.
On January 3rd at 10 p.m., Bragg began a retreat southward to Tullahoma, Tennessee – 36 miles away from Murfreesboro, which Rosecrans occupied two days later without any pursuit of after him. After the battle, Rosecrans commented on Bragg’s impressive performance by stating: “Bragg’s a good dog, but Hold Fast’s better.”
